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Secret sharing schemes are widely used now a days in various applications, which need more security, trust
and reliability. In secret sharing scheme, the secret is divided among the participants and only authorized set
of participants can recover the secret by combining their shares. The authorized set of participants are called
access structure of the scheme. In Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme (MSSS), k different secrets are distributed
among the participants, each one according to an access structure. Multi-secret sharing schemes have been
studied extensively by the cryptographic community. Number of schemes are proposed for the threshold multi-
secret sharing and multi-secret sharing according to generalized access structure with various features. In
this survey we explore the important constructions of multi-secret sharing for the generalized access structure
with their merits and demerits. The features like whether shares can be reused, participants can be enrolled or
dis-enrolled efficiently, whether shares have to modified in the renewal phase etc., are considered for the evaluation.
Keywords : Cheater Identification, General Access Structure, Multi-secret Sharing, Secret Sharing, Verifi-
ability.
1. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing schemes are important tool used
in security protocols. Originally motivated by
the problem of secure key storage by Shamir
[1], secret sharing schemes have found numer-
ous other applications in cryptography and dis-
tributed computing. Threshold cryptography [2],
access control [3], secure multi-party computation
[4] [5] [6], attribute based encryption [7] [8], gen-
eralized oblivious transfer [9] [10], visual cryptog-
raphy [11] etc., are the significant areas of devel-
opment using the secret sharing techniques.
In secret sharing, the secret is divided among
n participants in such a way that only designated
subset of participants can recover the secret, but
any subset of participants which is not a des-
ignated set cannot recover the secret. A set of
participants who can recover the secret is called
an access structure or authorized set, and a set
of participants which is not an authorized set is
called an unauthorized set or forbidden set. The
following are the two fundamental requirements
of any secret sharing scheme.
• Recoverability:Authorized subset of par-
ticipants should be able to recover the secret
by pooling their shares.
• Privacy:Unauthorized subset of partici-
pants should not learn any information
about the secret.
Let P = {Pi|i = 1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of par-
ticipants and the secret be K. The set of all se-
cret is represented by K. The set of all shares
S1, S2, . . . , Sn is represented by S. The partici-
pants set is partitioned into two classes.
1. The class of authorized sets Γ is called the
access structure.
2. The class of unauthorized sets Γc = 2P \ Γ
Let us assume that P ,K,S are all finite sets
and there is a probability distribution on K and
S. We use H(K) and H(S) to denote the entropy
of K and S respectively.
In a secret sharing scheme there is a special
participant called Dealer D /∈ P , who is trusted
by everyone. The dealer chooses a secret K ∈ K
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and the shares S1, S2, . . . , Sn corresponding to
the secret is generated. The shares are then dis-
tributed privately to the participants through a
secure channel.
In the secret reconstruction phase, participants
of an access set pool their shares together and re-
cover the secret. Alternatively participants could
give their shares to a combiner to perform the
computation for them. If an unauthorized set of
participants pool their shares they cannot recover
the secret. Thus a secret sharing scheme for the
access structure Γ is the collection of two algo-
rithms:
Distribution Algorithm:This algorithm has to
be run in a secure environment by a trustworthy
party called Dealer. The algorithm uses the func-
tion f , which for a given secret K ∈ K and a par-
ticipant Pi ∈ P , assigns a set of shares from the
set S that is f(K,Pi) = Si ⊆ S for i = 1, . . . , n.
f : K × P =⇒ 2S
Recovery Algorithm:This algorithm has to be
executed collectively by cooperating participants
or by the combiner, which can be considered as a
process embedded in a tamper proof module and
all participants have access to it. The combiner
outputs the generated result via secure channels
to cooperating participants. The combiner ap-
plies the function,
g : St =⇒ K
to calculate the secret. For any authorized set of
participants g(S1, . . . , St) = K, if P1, . . . , Pt ⊆ Γ.
If the group of participant belongs to an unau-
thorized set, the combiner fails to compute the
secret.
A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if
for all sets B, B ⊂ P and B /∈ Γ, if partici-
pants in B pool their shares together they can-
not reduce their uncertainty about S. That is,
H(K) = H(K | SB), where SB denote the col-
lection of shares of the participants in B. It is
known that for a perfect secret sharing scheme
H(Si) ≥ H(K). If H(Si) = H(K) then the se-
cret sharing scheme is called ideal.
An access structure Γ1 is minimal if Γ2 ⊂ Γ1
and Γ2 ∈ Γ implies that Γ2 = Γ1. Only monotone
access structure is considered for the construction
of the scheme in which Γ1 ∈ Γ and Γ1 ⊂ Γ2 im-
plies Γ2 ∈ Γ. The collection of minimal access sets
uniquely determines the access structure. The ac-
cess structure is the closure of the minimal access
set. The access structure Γ in terms of minimal
access structure is represented by Γmin(Γ0).
For an access structure Γ, the family of unau-
thorized sets Γc = 2P \ Γ has the property that,
given an unauthorized set B ∈ Γc then any subset
C ⊂ B is also an unauthorized set. An immedi-
ate consequence of this property is that for any
access structure Γ, the set of unauthorized sets
can be uniquely determined by its maximal set.
We use Γcmax to denote the representation of Γ
c
in terms of maximal set.
For all B ∈ Γ, if |B| ≥ t, then the access struc-
ture corresponds to a (t, n) threshold scheme. In
the (t, n) threshold scheme t or more participant
can reconstruct the secret. Section 2 gives an in-
sight into the threshold secret sharing schemes.
Secret sharing schemes realizing the general ac-
cess structures are mentioned in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 explores the various multi secret sharing
techniques in the literature. Section 5 is the sum-
mary where different schemes are compared for
their merits and demerits. Section 6 is the con-
clusion.
2. THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING
Development of secret sharing scheme started as
a solution to the problem of safeguarding cryp-
tographic keys by distributing the key among n
participants and t or more of the participants can
recover it by pooling their shares. Thus the au-
thorized set is any subset of participants contain-
ing more than tmembers. This scheme is denoted
as (t, n) threshold scheme.
The notion of a threshold secret sharing scheme
is independently proposed by Shamir [1] and
Blakley [12] in 1979. Since then much work
has been put into the investigation of such
schemes. Linear constructions were most effi-
cient and widely used. A threshold secret sharing
scheme is called perfect, if less than t shares give
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no information about the secret. Shamir’s scheme
is perfect while Blakley’s scheme is non perfect.
Both the Blakley’s and the Shamir’s construc-
tions realize t-out-of-n shared secret schemes.
However, their constructions are fundamentally
different.
Shamir’s scheme is based on polynomial inter-
polation over a finite field. It uses the fact that
we can find a polynomial of degree t − 1 given
t data points. A polynomial f(x) =
∑t−1
i=0 aix
i,
with a0 is set to the secret value and the coeffi-
cients a1 to at−1 are assigned random values in
the field is used for secret sharing. The value
f(i) is given to the user i as secret share. When t
out of n users come together they can reconstruct
the polynomial using Lagrange interpolation and
hence obtain the secret.
Blakley’s secret sharing scheme has a different
approach and is based on hyperplane geometry.
To implement a (t, n) threshold scheme, each of
the n users is given a hyper-plane equation in a t
dimensional space over a finite field such that each
hyperplane passes through a certain point. The
intersection point of these hyperplanes is the se-
cret. When t users come together, they can solve
the system of equations to find the secret.
McEliece and Sarwate [13] made an observa-
tion that Shamir’s scheme is closely related to
Reed-Solomon codes [14]. The error correcting
capability of this code can be translated into de-
sirable secret sharing properties. Karnin et al.,
[15] realize threshold schemes using linear codes.
Massey [16] introduced the concept of minimal
code words and provided that the access struc-
ture of a secret sharing scheme based on a [n, k]
linear code is determined by the minimal code-
words of the dual code.
Number theoretic concepts are also introduced
for threshold secret sharing scheme. The Mingo-
tee scheme [17] is based on modulo arithmetic and
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). A special
sequence of integers called Mingotte sequence is
used here. The shares are generated using this se-
quence. The secret is reconstructed by solving the
set of congruence equation using CRT. The Min-
gotte’s scheme is not perfect. A perfect scheme
based on CRT is proposed by Asmuth and Bloom
[18]. They also uses a special sequence of pairwise
coprime positive integers.
Kothari [19] gave a generalized threshold
scheme. A secret is represented by a scalar and
a linear variety is chosen to conceal the secret. A
linear function known to all trustees is chosen and
is fixed in the beginning, which is used to reveal
the secret from the linear variety. The n shad-
ows are hyperplanes containing the liner variety.
Moreover the hyperplanes are chosen to satisfy
the condition that, the intersection of less than t
of them results in a linear variety which projects
uniformly over the scalar field by the linear func-
tional used for revealing the secret. The number t
is called the threshold. Thus as more shadows are
known more information is revealed about the lin-
ear variety used to keep the secret, however no in-
formation is revealed until the threshold number
of shadows are known. He had shown that Blak-
ley’s scheme and Karin’s scheme are equivalent
and provided algorithms to convert one scheme
to another. He also stated that the schemes are
all specialization of generalized linear threshold
scheme. Brickell[20] also give a generalized no-
tion of Shamir and Blackley’s schemes using vec-
tor spaces.
Researchers have investigated (t, n) threshold
secret sharing extensively. Threshold schemes
that can handle more complex access struc-
tures have been described by Simmons [21] like
weighted threshold schemes, hierarchical scheme,
compartmental secret sharing etc. They were
found a wide range of useful applications. Sreeku-
mar et al., [22] in 2009, developed threshold
schemes based on Visual cryptography.
3. GENERALIZED SECRET SHARING
In the previous section, we mentioned that any t
of the n participants should be able to determine
the secret. A more general situation is to spec-
ify exactly which subsets of participants should
be able to determine the secret and which sub-
set should not. In this section we give the se-
cret sharing constructions based on generalized
access structure. Shamir [1] discussed the case
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of sharing a secret between the executives of a
company such that the secret can be recovered by
any three executives, or by any executive and any
vice-president, or by the president alone. This is
an example of hierarchical secret sharing scheme.
The Shamirs solution for this case is based on an
ordinary (3,m) threshold secret sharing scheme.
Thus, the president receives three shares, each
vice-president receives two shares and finally ev-
ery executive receives a single share.
The above idea leads to the so-called
weighted(or multiple shares based) threshold se-
cret sharing schemes. In these schemes, the
shares are pairwise disjoint sets of shares provided
by an ordinary threshold secret sharing scheme.
Benaloh and Leichter have proven in [23] that
there are access structures that can not be re-
alized using such scheme.
Several researchers address this problem and
introduced secret sharing schemes realizing the
general access structure. The most effecient
and easy to implement scheme was Ito, Saito,
Nishizeki’s [24] construction. It is based on
Shamir’s scheme. The idea is to distribute shares
to each authorized set of participants using mul-
tiple assignment scheme, where more than one
share is assigned to a participant, if he belongs to
more than one minimal authorized subset.
A simple scheme is mentioned by Beimel [25],
in which the secret S ∈ {0, 1} and let Γ be
any monotone access structure. The dealer shares
the secret independently for each authorized set
B ∈ Γ, where B = {Pi1, . . . , Pil}. The Dealer
chooses l − 1 random bits r1, . . . , rl−1. Compute
rl = S ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rl−1, and the Dealer dis-
tributes share rj to Pij . For each set B ∈ Γ, the
random bits are chosen independently and each
set in Γ can reconstruct the secret by computing
the exclusive-or of the bits given to the set. The
unauthorized set cannot do so.
The disadvantage with multiple share assign-
ment scheme is that the share size depends on
the number of authorized set that contain Pj . A
simple optimization is to share the secret S only
for minimal authorized sets. Still this scheme is
inefficient for access structures in which the num-
ber of minimal set is big (Eg:(n/2, n) scheme).
The share size grows exponentially in this case.
Benalohand Leichter [23] developed a secret
sharing scheme for an access structure based on
monotone formula. This generalizes the multiple
assignment scheme of Ito, Saito and Nishizeki
[24]. The idea is to translate the monotone access
structure into a monotone formula. Each variable
in the formula is associated with a trustee in P
and the value of the formula is true if and only
if the set of variables which are true corresponds
to a subset of P which is in the access structure.
This formula is then used as a template to de-
scribe how a secret is to be divided into shares.
The monotone function contains only AND and
OR operator. To divide a secret S into shares
such that P1 or P2 can reconstruct S. In this case
P1 and P2 can simply both be given values S. If
P1 and P2 need to reconstruct secret, then P1 can
be given value S1 and P2 can be given value S2
such that S = S1+S2 mod m,(0 ≤ S ≤ m), S1 is
chosen randomly from Zm, S2 is (S−S1) mod m.
More exactly, for a monotone authorized ac-
cess structure Γ of size n, they defined the set
FA as the set of formula on a set of variables
{v1, v2, . . . , vn} such that for every F ∈ FA the
interpretation of F with respect to an assigna-
tion of the variables is true if and only if the true
variables correspond to a set A ∈ Γ. They have
remarked that such formula can be used as tem-
plates for describing how a secret can be shared
with respect to the given access structure. Be-
cause the formula can be expressed using only
‘∧’ operators and ‘∨’ operators, it is sufficient to
indicate how to “split” the secret across these op-
erators.
Brickell [26] developed some ideal schemes for
generalized access structure using vector spaces.
Stinson [27] introduced a monotone circuit con-
struction based on monotone formula and also the
construction based on public distribution rules.
Benaloh’s scheme was generalized by Karchmer
and Wigderson [28], who showed that if an access
structure can be described by a small monotone
span program then it has an efficient scheme.
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Cumulative schemes were first introduced by
Ito et al., [24] and then used by several authors
to construct a general scheme for arbitrary ac-
cess structures. Simmons [21] proposed cumula-
tive map, Jackson [29] proposed a notion of cu-
mulative array. Ghodosi et al., [30] introduced
simpler and more efficient scheme and also intro-
duced capabilities to detect cheaters. Generalized
cumulative arrays in secret sharing is introduced
by Long [31].
4. MULTI SECRET SHARING
There are several situations in which more than
one secret is to be shared among participants. As
an example, consider the following situation, de-
scribed by Simmon [21]. There is a missile battery
and not all of the missiles have the same launch
enable code. We have to devise a scheme which
will allow any selected subset of users to enable
different launch code. The problem is to devise
a scheme which will allow any one, or any se-
lected subset, of the launch enable codes to be
activated in this scheme. This problem could be
trivially solved by realizing different secret shar-
ing schemes, one for each of the launch enable
codes, but this solution is clearly unacceptable
since each participant should remember too much
information. What is really needed is an algo-
rithm such that the same pieces of private infor-
mation could be used to recover different secrets.
One common drawback of all secret sharing
scheme is that, they are one-time schemes. That
is once a qualified group of participants recon-
structs the secret K by pooling their shares, both
the secret K and all the shares become known to
everyone, and there is no further secret. In other
words, the share kept by each participant can be
used to reconstruct only one secret.
Karnin, Greene and Hellman [15] in 1983 men-
tioned the multiple secret sharing scheme where
threshold number of users can reconstruct mul-
tiple secrets at the same time. Alternatively
the scheme can be used to share a large secret
by splitting it into smaller shares. Franklin et
al., [32], in 1992 used a technique in which the
polynomial-based single secret sharing is replaced
with a scheme where multiple secrets are kept hid-
den in a single polynomial. They also considered
the case of dependent secrets in which the amount
of information distributed to any participant is
less than the information distributed with inde-
pendent schemes. Both the schemes are not per-
fect. They are also one time threshold schemes.
That is, the shares cannot be reused.
Blundo et al., [33], in 1993 considered the case
in which m secrets are shared among participants
in a single access structure Γ in such a way that
any qualified set of participants can reconstruct
the secret. But any unqualified set of participants
knowing the value of number of secrets might de-
termine some (possibly no) information on other
secrets. Jackson et al., [34], in 1994 considered
the situation in which there is a secret Sk as-
sociated with each subset k of participants and
Sk can be reconstructed by any group of t par-
ticipants in k (t ≤ k). That is each subset of k
participants is associated with a secret which is
protected by a (t, k)-threshold access structure.
These schemes are called multi-secret threshold
schemes. They came up with a combinatorial
model and optimum threshold multi secret shar-
ing scheme. Information theoretic model similar
to threshold scheme is also proposed for multi-
secret sharing. They have generalized and classi-
fied the multi-secret sharing scheme based on the
following facts.
• Should all the secrets be available for po-
tential reconstruction during the lifetime of
the scheme, or should the access of secrets
be further controlled by enabling the recon-
struction of a particular secret only after ex-
tra information has been broadcast to the
participants.
• Whether the scheme can be used just once
to enable the secrets or should the scheme
be designed to enable multiple use.
• If the scheme is used more than once then
the reconstructed secret or shares of the
participants is known to all other partici-
pants or it is known to only the authorized
set.
18 Binu V P, et al.,
• The access structure is generalized or
threshold in nature.
In 1994 He and Dawson [35] proposed the gen-
eral implementation of multistage secret sharing.
The proposed scheme allows many secrets to be
shared in such a way that all secrets can be re-
constructed separately. The implementation uses
Shamir’s threshold scheme and assumes the ex-
istence of a one way function which is hard to
invert. The public shift technique is used here.
A t − 1 degree polynomial f(x) is constructed
first, as in Shamir’s scheme. The public shift val-
ues are di = zi − yi, where zi = f(xi). The yi’s
are the secret shares of the participant. yi’s are
then send to the participants secretly. For shar-
ing the next secret, h(yi) is used, where h is the
one way function. The secrets are reconstructed
in particular order, stage by stage and also this
scheme needs kn public values corresponds to the
k secrets. The advantage is that each partici-
pant has to keep only one secret element and is of
the same size as any shared secret. In 1995 Harn
[36] shows an alternative implementation of multi
stage secret sharing which requires only k(n− t)
public values. The implementation become very
attractive, especially when the threshold value t
is very close to the number of participants n. In
this scheme an (n− 1) degree polynomial f(x) is
evaluated at (n− t) points and are made public.
Any t participants can combine their shares with
the (n− t) public shares to interpolate the degree
(n − 1) polynomial. Multiple secrets are shared
with the help of one way function as in He and
Dawson scheme.
The desirable properties of a particular scheme
depends on both the requirements of the ap-
plication and also the implementation. Several
multi secret threshold schemes are developed by
the research community. In this survey we only
explore some of the important constructions of
multi-secret sharing scheme realizing general ac-
cess structure.
4.1. Cachin’s Scheme
A computationally secure secret sharing scheme
with general access structure, where all shares are
as short as the secret is proposed by Christian
Cachin [37] in 1995. The scheme also provides
capability to share multiple secrets and to dy-
namically add participants on-line without hav-
ing to redistribute new shares secretly to the cur-
rent participants. These capabilities are achieved
by storing additional authentic information in a
publicly accessible place which is called a notice-
board or bulletin board. This information can be
broadcast to the participants over a public chan-
nel. The protocol gains its security from any one-
way function.The construction has the following
properties.
• All shares must be transmitted and stored
secretly once for every participants and are
as short as the secret.
• Multiple secret can be shared with different
access structure requiring only one share
per participant for all secrets.
• Provides the ability for the dealer to change
the secret after the shares have been dis-
tributed.
• The dealer can distribute the shares on-
line. When a new participant is added and
the access structure is changed, already dis-
tributed shares remain valid. Shares must
be secretly send to the new participants and
the publicly readable information has to be
changed.
Let the secret K be an element of finite Abelian
GroupG =< G,+ >. The basic protocol to share
a single secret is as follows.
1. The dealer randomly chooses n elements
S1, S2, . . . , Sn from G according to the uni-
form distribution and send them secretly to
the participants over a secret channel.
2. For each minimal qualified subset X ∈ Γ0,
the dealer computes
TX = K − f(
∑
x:Px∈X
SX)
and publishes T = TX |X ∈ Γ0 on the bul-
letin board.
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In order to recover the secret K, a qualified set
of participants Y proceeds as follows.
1. The members of Y agree on a minimal qual-
ified subset X⊆Y .
2. The members of X add their shares to-
gether to get VX =
∑
x:Px∈X
SX and apply
the one-way function f to the result.
3. They fetch TX from the bulletin board and
compute K = TX + f(VX)
The shares of the participants in X are used
in the computation to recover the secret K. For
the basic scheme where only one secret is shared,
the shares do not have to be kept secret during
this computation. However for sharing multiple
secrets the shares and the result of their addition
have to be kept secret.
In order to share multiple secrets K1,K2, . . . ,Kh
with different access structures Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,Γh
among the same set of participants P , the dealer
has to distribute the private shares Si only once
but prepares Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,Γh for each secret. The
single secret sharing scheme cannot be applied
directly for multi secret sharing because it is not
secure. If a group of participants X qualified to
recover both K1 and K2 then any group Y ∈ Γ1
can obtain K2 as
K2 = T 2X + T
1
Y + f(VY )− T
1
X
To remedy this deficiency, the function f is re-
placed by a family F = fh of one-way functions so
that different one-way functions are employed for
different secrets. The following protocol is used
to share m secrets.
1. The dealer randomly chooses n elements
S1, S2, . . . , Sn from G and send them se-
curely to the participants as shares.
2. For each secret Kh to share( with h =
1, . . . ,m) and for each minimal qualified
subset X ∈ Γh0 , the dealer computes
T hX = K
h − fh(
∑
x:Px∈X
Sx)
and publishes T h = {T hX |X ∈ Γ
h
0} on the
bulletin board.
In order ro recover some secret Kh, a set of par-
ticipants Y ∈ Γ h proceeds as follows.
1. The members of Y agree on a minimal qual-
ified subset X⊆Y .
2. The members of X add their shares to-
gether to get VX =
∑
x:Px∈X
SX and apply
the one-way function fh to the result.
3. They fetch T hX from the bulletin board and
compute Kh = T hX + fh(VX)
The scheme does not demand a particular or-
der for the reconstruction of the secrets as in
He and Dawson scheme. The required family of
functions F can be easily be obtained from f by
setting fh(x) = f(h + x), when h is represented
suitably in G. Because different one-way func-
tion fh is used for each secret, it is computation-
ally secure. But the shares have to be protected
from the eyes of other participants during the re-
construction. Otherwise, these participants could
subsequently recover other secrets they are not
allowed to know. Therefore the computation of
fh(VX) should be done with out revealing the se-
cret shares.
In many situations, the participant of a secret
sharing scheme do not remain the same during the
entire life-time of the secret. The access structure
may also change. In this scheme it is assumed
that the changes to the access structure are mono-
tone, that is participants are only added and
qualified subsets remain qualified. The scheme is
not suitable for access structures which are non-
monotonic. Removing participants is also an is-
sue which is not addressed. In multi-secret shar-
ing, the shares must be kept hidden to carry out
the computation. Cachin suggest that computa-
tions involved in recovering K could be hidden
from the participants, using a distributed evalu-
ation protocol proposed by Goldreich et al., [38].
For access to a predetermined number of secrets
in fixed order, a variant of one-time user authen-
tication protocol of Lamport [39]could be used.
The proposed scheme has many practical appli-
cations in situations where the participants and
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the access rules or the secret itself frequently
change. No new shares have to be distributed
secretly when new participants are included or
participants leave. Such situation often arise in
key management, escrowed system etc.
4.2. Pinch’s Scheme
The Cachin’s scheme does not allow shares to be
reused after the secret has been reconstructed. A
distributed computation sub protocol is proposed
using one way function but it allows the secret to
be reconstructed in a specified order. Pinch [40]
in 1996 proposed a modified algorithm based on
the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem,
in which arbitrary number of secrets can be re-
constructed without having to redistribute new
shares.
Let M be a multiplicative group in which the
Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable. That is,
given elements g, gx and gy in M it is compu-
tationally infeasible to obtain gxy. This implies
the intractability of the discrete logarithm prob-
lem. If the discrete logarithm problem can be
solved then the Diffie-Hellman problem can also
be solved. Suppose f : M =⇒ G is a one-way
function, where G be the additive group modulo
some prime p and M be the multiplicative group
to the same modulus, which will be cyclic of order
q. The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. The dealer randomly chooses secret shares
Si, as integers coprime to q, for each par-
ticipant Pi and send them through a secure
channel. Alternatively Diffie-Hellman key
exchange can be used using the groupM to
securely exchange Si.
2. For each minimal trusted set X ∈ Γ, the
dealer randomly chooses gX to be a gener-
ator of M and computes
TX = K − f
(
g
∏
x∈X
Sx
X
)
and publish (gX , TX) on the notice board.
In order to recover the secret K, a minimal
trusted set X = P1, . . . , Pt, of participants comes
together and follow the protocol mentioned be-
low.
1. Member P1 reads gX from the notice board
and computes gS1X and passes the result to
P2.
2. Each subsequent member Pi, for 1 < i < t,
receives g
S1···Si−1
X and raises this value to
the power Si to form
VX = g
∏t
i=1
Si
X = g
∏
x∈X
Sx
X
3. On behalf of the group X , the member Pt
reads TX from the notice board and can now
reconstruct K as K = TX + f(VX).
If there are multiple secrets Ki to share, it is now
possible to use the same one way function f , pro-
vided that each entry on the notice board has
a fresh value of g attached. There is a variant
proposal which avoids the necessity for the first
participant to reveal gS1 at the first step. The par-
ticipant P1 generates a random r modulo q and
passes the result of grS1 to P2. The participant
Pt will pass g
rS1···St
X back to P1. P1 can find w
such that rw ≡ 1 mod q and raises grS1···SnX to
the power w to form
VX = g
∏
t
i=1
Si
X = g
∏
x∈X Sx
X
Ghodosi et al., [41] showed that Pinch’s scheme
is vulnerable to cheating and they modified the
scheme to include cheating prevention technique.
In Pinch’s scheme a dishonest participant Pi ∈ X
may contribute a fake share S
′
i = αSi, where α is
a random integer modulo q. Since every partici-
pant of an authorized set has access to the final
result g
S1,··· ,S
′
i,··· ,St
X , the participant Pi can calcu-
late the value
(
g
S1,··· ,S
′
i,··· ,St
X
)α−1
=
gS1,··· ,Si,··· ,StX = g
∏
x∈X Sx
X = VX
and hence obtain the correct secret, where as the
other participants will get an invalid secret.
The cheating can be detected by publishing
gVXX corresponds to the every authorized set X in
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the initialization step by the dealer. Every par-
ticipants x ∈ X can verify whether gVXX = g
V ′X
X ,
where V ′X is the reconstructed value. However this
cannot prevent cheating or cheaters can be iden-
tified. The cheating can be prevented by publish-
ing extra information on the notice board. Let
C =
∑
x∈X g
Sx
x . For each authorized set X , the
dealer also publishes CX = g
C
X . At the recon-
struction phase, every participant Pi ∈ X com-
putes gSix and broadcasts it to all participants in
the set X . Thus every participant can computes
C and verifies CX = g
C
X . If the verification fails,
then the protocol stops. If there exist a group of
collaborating cheats, they can cheat in the first
stage. Yeun et al., [42] proposed a modified ver-
sion of the Pinch’s protocol which identifies all
cheaters regardless of their number, improving on
previous results by Pinch and Ghodosi et al.
4.3. RJH and CCH scheme
An efficient computationally secure on-line secret
sharing scheme is proposed by Re-Junn Hwang
and Chin-Chen Chang [43] in 1998. In this each
participant hold a single secret which is as short
as the shared secret. They are selected by the par-
ticipants itself, so a secure channel is not required
between the dealer and the participants. Partici-
pants can be added or deleted and secrets can be
renewed with out modifying the secret share of
the participants. The shares of the participants
is kept hidden and hence can be used to recover
multi secrets. The scheme is multi use unlike the
one time multi secret sharing scheme.
In Cachin’s and Pinch’s schemes, the dealer
has to store the shadow of each participant to
maintain the on-line property. The dealer storing
the shares is an undesirable property in secret
sharing scheme. This scheme avoids the problem
and provides great capabilities for many applica-
tions. The scheme has four phases:initialization
phase, construction phase, recovery phase and re-
construction/renew phase.
Assume that there are n participants
P1, P2, . . . , Pn, sharing a secretK with the mono-
tone access structure Γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . , γt}. In the
initialization phase the dealer select two strong
primes p and q and publishes N on the pub-
lic bulletin, where N is the multiplication of p
and q. The dealer also chooses another integer
g from the interval [N1/2, N ] and another prime
Q which is larger than N and publishes them.
Each participant can select an integer Si in the
interval [2, N ] and computes Ui = g
Si mod N .
Each participant keeps Si secret and send the
pseudo share Ui and the identifier IDi to the
dealer. If certain different participant select same
shadow, the dealer asks for new shadows or al-
ternatively the dealer can select the shares and
send to the participants securely. But this need a
secure channel. Finally dealer publishes (IDi, Ui)
of each participant Pi in the public bulletin.
In the construction phase the dealer computes
and publishes some information for each qualified
subset in access structure Γ. The participants of
any qualified subset γj can cooperate to recover
the shared secret K by using these information
and the values generated from their shadows in
the recovery phase. The public information cor-
responds to each qualified set is generated as fol-
lows.
• Randomly select an integer S0 from the in-
terval [2, N ] such that S0 is relatively prime
to p− 1 and q − 1.
• Compute U0 = g
S0mod N and U0 6= Ui for
all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
• Generate an integer h such that S0 × h =
1 mod φ(N).
• Publish U0 and h on the public bulletin.
• For each minimal qualified subset γj =
Pj1, Pj2, . . . , Pjd of Γ0, the dealer computes
public information Tj as follows.
• Compute Hj = K ⊕ (U
S0
j1 mod N) ⊕
(US0j2 mod N) ⊕, . . . ,⊕(U
S0
jd mod N)
• Use d+1 points (0, Hj), (IDj1, (U
S0
j1 mod N)),
. . . , (IDjd, (U
S0
jd mod N)) to construct a
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polynomial f(X) of degree d
f(x) = Hj ×
d∏
k=1
(X − IDjk)/(−IDjk)+
d∑
l=1
[(PS0jl mod N)× (X/IDjl)×
d∏
k=1
k 6=l
(X − IDjk)/(IDjl − IDjk)] mod Q
where d is the number of participants in
qualified subset γj
• Compute and publish Tj = f(1) on the pub-
lic bulletin.
In the recovery phase participants of any qual-
ified subset can cooperate to recover the shared
secret K as follows.
• Each participant gets (U0, h,N) from the
public bulletin.
• Each participant Pij , computes and pro-
vides Sji
′
= U
Sji
0 mod N ,where Sji
′
is the
pseudo share of Pji. S
′h
ji mod N = Uji,
then S
′
ji is the true shadow else it is false
and the participant Pji is the cheater.
• Get Tj from the public bulletin and use d+
1 points (1, Tj), (IDj1, S
′
j1), . . . , (IDjd, S
′
jd)
and use Lagrange interpolation to recon-
struct the d degree polynomial f(X):
f(X) = Tj ×
d∏
k=1
(X − IDjk)/(1− IDjk)+
d∑
l=1
[(S
′
jl × (X − 1/IDjl − 1)×
d∏
k=1
k 6=l
(X − IDjk)/(IDjl − IDjk)] mod Q
• Compute Hj = f(0) and recover the secret
K = Hj ⊕ S
′
j1 ⊕ S
′
j2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ S
′
jd
When new participants join the group, the
access structure changes. The dealer then per-
forms the construction phase and publish the new
public information. The older participants share
remain the same. When the participants disen-
rolled, the corresponding minimal qualified subset
should be deleted from the access structure. The
shared secret should be renewed for security con-
sideration. Public information must be changed
in this case but the rest of the authorized par-
ticipants still hold the same shadows. Changing
the shared secret can also be done by modifying
the public values but the same shadows can be
reused.
Adding a new subset can also be done easily.
If the new qualified subset contains an old mini-
mal qualified subset in the access structure, then
nothing needs to be done. If there are old minimal
qualified subsets in the new qualified subset, the
old ones shall be deleted from the access structure
and the public information is updated according
to the new access structure. Canceling a qualified
subset needs the shared secret to be renewed. The
public information corresponds to the rest of the
qualified subset must be modified. The public in-
formation corresponds to the canceled subset is
of no use and is removed. It is noted that the
dealer does not need to collect the shadows of all
the participants to reconstruct the secret sharing
scheme again.
To share multiple secrets K1,K2, . . . ,Kn with
the access structure Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,Γn, each partic-
ipant holds only one share Si for these n se-
crets. For each shared secret Ki the dealer se-
lect a unique Si0 and publishes the corresponding
hi, U0i. The dealer also generate and publishes
the information Tij for each qualified subset γij
in minimal access structure Γi. The participants
of each qualified subset γij in Γi can cooperate to
recover the shared secret Ki by performing the
recovery phase.
4.4. Sun’s Scheme
In Pinch’s scheme high computation overhead
is involved and also sequential reconstruction is
used in the recovery phase. In 1999 Sun [44] pro-
posed a scheme having the advantages of lower
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computation overhead and parallel reconstruction
in the secret recovery phase. The security of the
scheme is only based on one-way function, not on
any other intractable problem.
Let f be a one way function with both domain
and range G. The following protocol is used to
share m secrets K [h] with access structures Γ[h]
for h = 1, . . . ,m.
1. The dealer randomly chooses n secret shares
Si, . . . , Sn and send them to the partici-
pants through a secret channel.
2. For every shared secret K [h] and for ev-
ery minimal qualified subset X ∈ Γ
[h]
0 , the
dealer randomly chooses R
[h]
X in G and com-
putes
T
[h]
X = K
[h] −
∑
x:Px∈X
f(R
[h]
X + Sx)
and publishes H [h] = {(R
[h]
X , T
[h]
X )|X ∈
Γ
[h]
0 } on the notice board.
In order to recover the secret K [h], a set of par-
ticipants Y ∈ Γ[h] proceeds as follows
1. The members of Y agree on a minimal
qualified subset X ⊆ Y , where X =
{P1, . . . , Pt}
2. Each member Pi reads R
[h]
X from the notice
board and computes f(R
[h]
X + Si) and send
the result to Pt who is designated as secret
re-constructor.
3. Pt receives f(R
[h]
X + Si) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1,
and reconstructs the secret K [h] = T
[h]
X +∑t
i=1 f(R
[h]
X + Si)
Once the secret is reconstructed it become pub-
lic. f(R
[h]
X +Si) is unique for every secret and ev-
ery authorized set. Most of the implementations
of one way functions are based on permutations,
substitution and XOR operation. Therefore the
computation is much faster than the exponenti-
ation. The step2 of the reconstruction phase can
proceed parallelly where as in Pinch’s scheme the
construction is sequential. Cheating can be de-
tected by putting additional information f(K [h])
on the notice board for every shared secret. Any
one can verify the correctness of the computed
secret. The scheme can also detect cheaters by
putting additional information C
[h]
X,i = f(f(R
[h]
X +
Si)) for every secret K
h, every authorized set X
and for every participant Pi. The scheme is dy-
namic. Participants or new access structure can
be added by distributing shares to the new par-
ticipants and update public information on the
notice board. The previously distributed shares
remain valid. When some participants or some
access structures need to be deleted, the shared
secret should be renewed. The dealer only need
to update the information on bulletin board.
4.5. Adhikari et al., Scheme
An efficient, renewable, multi use, multi-secret
sharing scheme for general access structure is pro-
posed by Angsuman Das and Avishek Adhikari
[45] in 2010. The scheme is based on one way
hash function and is computationally more ef-
ficient. Both the combiner and the participants
can also verify the correctness of the information
exchanged among themselves in this. The scheme
consist of three phases. The dealer phase, pseudo-
share generation phase and the combiner’s phase.
Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be the set of par-
ticipants and S1, S2, . . . , Sk be the k secrets to
be shared by a trusted dealer. Each secret is of
size q bits. ΓSi = {Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Ait} be the access
structure corresponds to the secret Si and Ail is
the l’th qualified subset of the access structure of
the i’th secret Si
In the dealer phase, the dealer D chooses a col-
lision resistant one-way hash function H , which
takes as argument a binary string of arbitrary
length and produces an output a binary string of
fixed length q, where q is the length of each secret.
The dealer also choose randomly xα the shares of
size q and send to the participants through a se-
cure channel.
In the pseudo share generation phase, a pseudo
share corresponds to each secret and for each au-
thorized set is generated from the participants se-
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Table 1
Comparison of Multi secret sharing schemes
Properties Cachin [37] Pinch [40] RJH CCH [43] Sun [44] Das [45] Roy [46]
share size same as secret Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
use of one way function Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
use of discrete logarithm No Yes Yes No No No
use of interpolation No No Yes No No Yes
shares remain secret dur-
ing reconstruction
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dealer knows the share Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
shares can be reused No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dynamic No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
verifiability No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
cret share in the following way
Sij = Si
⊕


⊕
α:Pα∈Aij
H(xα ‖ il ‖ jm)


where il represent the l bit representation of
the number of secret ie; l = ⌊log2k⌋ + 1 and
m = ⌊log2t⌋+1 , t is the maximum size of an au-
thorized subset among the access structures cor-
responds to different secrets.The dealer then pub-
lishes the values Sij , H(Si), H
2(xα ‖ il ‖ jm)
In the combiners phase the participants of an
authorized subset Aij of ΓSi submit the pseudo
share H(xα ‖ il ‖ jm) which is then x-or with Sij
to get the secret Si by the combiner.
Si = Sij
⊕


⊕
α:Pα∈Aij
H(xα ‖ il ‖ jm)


The combiner can verify the pseudo share given
by the participant by checking it with the pub-
lic value H2(xα ‖ il ‖ jm). The participants can
check whether the combiner is giving them back
the correct secret Si by verifying it with the pub-
lic value H(Si).
Adhikari and Roy [46] also proposed a simi-
lar scheme with polynomial interpolation. In this
scheme, for each authorized subset in the access
structure corresponds to a secret, a polynomial of
degree m−1 is created with the constant term as
the secret Si, where m is the number of partici-
pants in the authorized subset.
fSiq (x) = Si + d
iq
1 x+ d
iq
2 x
2 + . . .+ d
iq
miq−1
xmiq−1
For each participant P
iq
b ∈ A
Si
q in ΓSi the dealer
compute pseudo share U
iq
Pb
= h(x
P
iq
b
) ‖ il ‖ qm,
where xi is the secret share of the participant and
i = 1, . . . , k; q = 1, . . . , l; b = 1, . . . ,m. The dealer
also computes B
iq
Pb
= fSiq (ID
iq
b ). Finally the shift
values are computed and published corresponds
to each secret and each authorized subset M
iq
Pb
=
B
iq
Pb
− U
iq
Pb
.
In the reconstruction phase the pseudo shares
of authorized set of participant can be added
with the public information to obtain B
iq
Pb
=
fSiq (ID
iq
b ) =M
iq
Pb
+U
iq
Pb
. The secret can be recon-
structed by interpolation using these m values.
Si =
∑
b∈{1,2,...,miq}
B
iq
Pb
∏
r∈{1,2,...,miq r 6=b}
−ID
P
iq
r
ID
P
iq
b
−ID
P
iq
r
, It is noted that the computational
complexity is more in this case, compared with
the previous scheme.
5. SUMMARY
In this section we give a brief summary of the
important constructions for multi-secret sharing
corresponds to generalized access structures. The
table 1 summarize and compares the important
properties of different schemes. The important
technique used for the constructions are based
on one way functions, discrete logarithm prob-
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lem and Shamir’s secret sharing technique. The
schemes based on discrete logarithm problem and
hash functions provide only computational secu-
rity because the security depends on the com-
putational complexity of these problems. But
for many of the cryptographic application with
polynomial time bounded adversary, the compu-
tational security is sufficient. For maintaining the
unconditional security, large number of shares
must be kept by the participant. The number
of shares that must be kept is proportional to the
number of secret to be shared.
The public values in the bulletin board of each
scheme is proportional to the number of autho-
rized subset in an access structure corresponds
to each key. There will be at least one public
value corresponds to each authorized subset in
the access structure corresponds to a key. There
are also additional public parameters used for
the security of the scheme. The computational
complexity depends on the complexity of the one
way function used or the modular exponentia-
tion. But these operations can be efficiently done
in polynomial time. The most commonly used
one way functions like LFSR, MD5, SHA are all
based on simple xor, permutation and substitu-
tion operation. So these schemes can be imple-
mented in polynomial time. Modular exponenti-
ation is time consuming with large exponent but
efficient algorithm exist for the fast computation.
The share generation and reconstruction in the
Shamir’s scheme, which uses polynomial interpo-
lation can also be implemented efficiently.
All the scheme mentioned assumes that the
dealer is a trusted person. Cheating detection
mechanisms are also proposed in some schemes
with the help of additional public parameters.
The combiner can verify the share submitted
by the participants and the participant can also
check the reconstructed secret. However the se-
curity is computational. If the computational
problem is solved, the secret can be revealed
by an adversary.The mathematical model, secu-
rity notions and computational security for multi-
secret sharing is proposed by Javier Herranz et
al., [47] [48] in 2013.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have explored some important multi-secret
sharing techniques for generalized monotone ac-
cess structure in this survey. There are sev-
eral threshold multi-secret sharing schemes where
multiple secrets are shared, each with different
threshold. These schemes are not considered here.
The emphasis is given to a more generalized no-
tion, where each secret is shared according to a
monotone generalized access structure. Thresh-
old multi-secret sharing also found several appli-
cations and we prefer users to further look into
it. The major concern in the multi-secret shar-
ing is the large number of public values and the
computational complexity. Only computational
security can be achieved in all the schemes men-
tioned, where security depends on the security of
some computationally hard problem. Multi-secret
sharing schemes have found numerous applica-
tion in implementing authentication mechanisms,
resource management in cloud, multi policy dis-
tributed signatures, multi policy distributed de-
cryption etc..
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